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Justice DanielJ. O'Hern: The "Little Guy's" Justice
The Hon. Gary S. Stein"
In his biography of former Supreme Court Justice Byron White
entitled The Man Who Once Was Whizzer White, author Dennis
Hutchinson attributed to Justice White the observation that "[e]very
time a new justice arrives on the Court, the Court's a different
[institution]. 2 The retirement on May 23, 2000 of Justice Daniel J.
O'Hern, my colleague on the Court for more than fifteen years,
prompts me to revisitJustice White's thesis.
Dan O'Hern brought a unique perspective to our Court. He
had a full appreciation of our institutional role as New Jersey's court
of last resort, and as a national leader in such areas as judicial
administration and lawyer discipline.
Complementing his
institutional perspective, however, was a keen awareness that
invariably there was a human face behind the names of the litigants
before our Court.
Justice O'Hern will leave an enduring and indelible imprint on
our Court conferences, where perhaps the Court's most important
work is done. Addressing his colleagues, the Justice often would
identify and emphasize personal aspects of a controversy that had
been glossed over in the briefs and oral argument. Although Justice
O'Hern's views did not necessarily dictate the outcome of an appeal,
rare indeed was the case in which the Court's ultimate disposition was
not influenced significantly by his unique ability to illuminate
compelling legal issues by reference to simple truths and common
experiences. The strong values that infused his personal life with his
beloved Barbara, and the close-knit O'Hern children and
grandchildren, were rarely, if ever, irrelevant to his decisional
deliberations.
Justice O'Hern placed a high premium on collegiality and the
value of unanimity in high-profile cases, but he was never reluctant to
stand alone to vindicate important principles. His was a strongly
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unifying voice on the Court, even though the Justice authored many
separate opinions.
Justice O'Hern's published opinions eloquently reflect his
personal values and judicial philosophy. Even the formality of
judicial opinion writing, however, cannot obscure Justice O'Hern's
humanity and common decency. The result is that the Justice's
opinions also provide a window for those who seek a fuller
understanding of his significant behind-the-scenes role on the Court.
A revealing snapshot of Justice O'Hern's uniquely personal and
pragmatic approach to judging is afforded by a trilogy of opinions
concerning Department of Human Services regulations purporting to
end benefits provided to needy families and individuals. Of the
Williams v.
three, two opinions were signed by Justice O'Hem:
Department of Human Services3 and L. T. v. Department of Human
Services.4 I also include references to the earliest of the three, Franklin
v. Department of Human Services,5 an unsigned opinion, in the interest
of completeness.
In Franklin, the Public Advocate and homeless families
challenged a Department of Human Services (DHS) regulation
establishing a five-month maximum period for a form of Emergency
Assistance (EA) benefits established under the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The opinion's author took
pains to personalize the plight of some of the families affected by the
regulation's termination date before considering the legal issue
presented:
This case concerns a small group of unfortunate families for

whom emergency accommodations may be the last stop before
the street. They are not the familiar single urban dwellers who
seek shelter in bus or train stations when the street is
inhospitable. Rather, they are drawn from that larger group of
relatively intact families in cities and suburbs who receive some
public assistance but not enough both to sustain decent housing
and to meet their other basic needs.... For purposes of this

appeal, we will refer to but a few lives of the original plaintiffs that
demonstrate the "pulse of life" beneath the official version of
events. The names of the people, but not the facts of their lives,
have been changed....

Helen Heath was evicted from her Toms River apartment in
1987 when her husband failed to pay rent for two months while

4
5

116 N.J. 102, 561 A.2d 244 (1989).
134 N.J. 304, 633 A.2d 964 (1993).
111 N.J. 1,543 A.2d 1 (1988).

2000]

A TRIBUTE TOJUSTICE O'HERN

she was in the hospital. She is forty-four years old. Her parents
are aged and cannot care for her. Her husband has since left her
and her two teenage sons. She receives AFDC benefits for the two
children. She wants a permanent home for them: "I search for
housing every day. I constantly check the newspaper ads for
rentals." To be sure, there is housing available, but the rents are
usually between $550 and $650 per month. She receives $424 a
month under the AFDC program. She is temporarily housed in
an Ocean County hotel.
Mary Elmer had to leave an apartment to avoid exposing her
two pre-school children to drugs in that environment. She
searches for permanent housing in Newark, Linden, Orange,
West Orange, and other urban areas. "I have been unable to
locate safe and decent permanent housing I can afford." She is
about to be evicted from a motel in Monmouth County. Rentals
in Monmouth County "begin at $900 for a three-bedroom
apartment." Elsewhere she finds nothing less than $500. Her
AFDC grant is $389 a month. She receives $150 in food stamps.
Antoinette Ellis is twenty-one years old; she lives in a Monmouth
County motel. She may have herself to blame for many of her
problems in that she was drug- and alcohol-dependent and "often
moved from place to place." But her two children under two
years of age must find shelter, clothing, and some incidentals out
of $425 a month. Rents in the Elizabeth area where she wants to
reside average between $450 and $500 per month. She receives
$132 in food stamps.
Colleen Johnson is thirty-one years of age; she has three
children. She lived in a barely habitable apartment in Newark.
She could not stand to see her children exposed any longer to
substandard housing conditions, but she could not find housing
on her own. Her county agency placed her in a highway hotel in
Monmouth County, New Jersey. She has no way to get around;
there is no public transportation. Her children are taunted in
their school district for being homeless. She sees no apartments
for rent that are less than $600 per month. She receives $485 a
month in AFDC benefits and $186 per month in food stamps.
These claimants do not want to perpetuate this system and live
in one room in a highway hotel; the last thing in the world they
want is to be isolated from family and friends. "Homelessness
functions not as a freely chosen option but as a tragic, inexorable
destiny." . . . The problem arises primarily from the inexorable
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stress of a housing market that has outpaced their budgets.
Everyone agrees on this point.6
The Court observed that the average EA cost of $1200 per
month per family was "a most inefficient method of providing shelter
for the homeless" and that "of all the solutions to the problem of
housing the homeless, the welfare hotel is probably the worst. 7 The
Court also took note of representations by the DHS Commissioner
concerning new legislative funding for the homeless and new DHS
programs to assist counties in placing homeless families currently
Transforming the Commissioner's
housed in welfare hotels.'
representations concerning new programs into a guarantee of a safety
net, the Court declined to invalidate the five-month limitation on EA
benefits in view of the Commissioner's "assurance" that shelter would
be provided:
Everyone agrees that the spectacle of housing a family in a hotel
room offends even the most callous of us. N.J.S.A. 44:10-1 (a) (1)
states as the purpose of AFDC the care of children "in their own
homes or in the homes of relatives," not in hotels. The
Commissioner's plans seek to get these children out of hotels
sooner and not later.
The Commissioner has not abandoned these children; he has
expressed before us an intent to exercise a supervising
responsibility with respect to identifying funding and
coordinating solutions to the problem of housing homeless
families. For him, the impetus to set a termination date for EA
stems from a desire to find better housing solutions. In sum,
then, the question that we have been presented with is whether it
is legal to terminate the emergency aid to the homeless families of
dependent children after five months, if other programs, formal
and informal, are in place to make reasonably certain that the
families previously housed in motels will find shelter and
eventually housing elsewhere. The answer to that question is
obviously yes.
In Williams, the issue was the legality of a DHS regulation
terminating emergency shelter assistance benefits to homeless
individuals, as distinguished from the families and children affected
by the termination of AFDC benefits in Franklin. Once again,
6 Id. at 4-6, 543 A.2d 2-3 (quotingJohn C. Connell, A Right to Emergency Shelter for
the Homeless Under the New Jersey Constitution, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 765, 769 (1987)
(footnote omitted)).
7 Id. at 15-16, 543 A.2d at 7-8.
8 See id.at 13-14, 543 A.2d at 7.
9
Id. at 19-20, 543 A.2d at 9.
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quoting from the brief of Legal Services of New Jersey, Justice
O'Hern personalized the legal issue confronting the Court:
GA recipients are not families.
They do not have the
sympathetic appeal of children, and do not receive the same
attention from the other branches of government and the media.
Indeed they are almost the forgotten homeless. Yet they are
elderly, sick, disabled, needy, down and out.
They need
declaratory relief from this court to declare their rights, and to
bring the necessity of a resolution of their plight to the forefront.
If this branch of government does not react, petitioner's plight
will go ignored; their rights will be lost.'0
Responding to representations in the record about the myriad of
state, county, and municipal programs intended to provide assistance
for the homeless, the Court sought "clarification of which agency has
the responsibility to provide shelter of last resort."" Justice O'Hern
insisted that the State identify the agency with ultimate responsibility
to provide shelter for the homeless:
Society has no interest in a process that shuffles the claimant from
agency to agency in search of the bureaucratic official who is
finally charged with responsibility to fulfill the commitment in the
Prevention of Homelessness Act [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-280 to
52:27D-287 (West 1984)], that "[i]t is the longstanding policy of
this State that no person should suffer unnecessarily from cold or
hunger, or be deprived of shelter."
We realize that government cannot achieve the impossible and
that despite the best of efforts, some people will indeed slip
through the net. But it should not be because there has been an
administrative misunderstanding about the respective roles of the
agencies of government and the programs that they administer.
The danger that we face with the depersonalization of
government is that program manuals, and not people, will decide
when government can do no more.I
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Hern rejected the
DHS' central argument "that the EA program is essentially a
discretionary program and that, therefore, it does not lie in the
Court's province to tell the Commissioner how to exercise his
discretion."'' 3 Instead, as the Court did in Franklin, Justice O'Hern
10 See Williams v. Department of Human Servs., 116 N.J. 102, 105, 561 A.2d 244,
246 (1989).

1 Id. at 121, 561 A.2d at 254.
Id. at 123, 561 A.2d at 255 (quoting N.J.

12

1984)).

isId. at 118, 561 A.2d at 253.

STAT. ANN.

52:27D-281(a) (West
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construed the Commissioner's representations about added funding
and new programs as a safety-net guarantee. The Court extended the
effectiveness of the regulations for four additional months, and then
upheld their expiration on condition that "DHS shall have set in
place by December 1, 1989, through proper administrative
procedures, the new programs that it believes will make reasonably
certain that the individuals previously housed in motels will find
shelter and eventually housing elsewhere.' 4 As in Franklin, the DHS'
protestations that existing programs made Court intervention
unnecessary were accepted by the Court as an assurance that standby
shelter would be provided for the homeless.
In L.T., the issue was the validity of a twelve-month limit on
benefits to homeless citizens provided through the State's temporary
rental assistance program. In an effort to again personalize the plight
of those affected by the termination of benefits, Justice O'Hern
provided thumbnail sketches of each of the five plaintiffs' 5 and also

quoted from Commissioner Waldman's Special Report to the
Legislature on General Assistance in order to provide a description of
the affected population:
"[s]tereotypes of [General Assistance (GA)] recipients are illfounded and incorrect. Those who stereotype recipients as
generally men in their 20's and 30's who have trouble keeping a
job ignore those individuals who are chronically unemployed or
underemployed and those with chronic health problems who
have barriers that prevent them from maintaining employment.
The [GA] population is very diverse. It ranges from the 18 year
old high school drop out with virtually no work history who is
unable to find a job in the current economy; to the 40 year old
former factory worker who was laid off as a result of down sizing,
has now exhausted his/her unemployment benefits and finds
his/her 20 years of assembly line experience to be in little
demand; to the 50 year old with a graduate degree who is unable
to find work; to the 63 year old alcoholic who is too ill to work but
not considered to be disabled by the Social Security
Administration. For these people and thousands of others with
somewhat different stories, the GA program represents their last
hope, the final shred of the safety net."' 6

Id. at 121, 561 A.2d at 254.
See L.T. v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 134 N.J. 304, 308-10, 633 A.2d
964, 966-67 (1993).
16 Id. at 307, 633 A.2d at 966 (quoting William Waldman,
Commissioner of
14
15

Department of Human Services, A SPEcIAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON GENERAL

AssIsTANcE 1, 7 (1993)).
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Justice O'Hern focused on the devastating effects of homelessness:
We are aware of the great demands that are made on an agency
of government like DHS. Undoubtedly, DHS wishes that it had
more funds in order to supervise the far-flung operations of the
[Municipal Works Departments] that shelter the homeless, as well
as more funds to feed the hungry, care for the children and
elderly, and heal the sick, because all needy people are deserving
of the agency's attention. However, although there are no
rankings

in the

"catalog of human suffering,"

. .

.

surely

homelessness represents something uniquely devastating to the
human spirit. As a society, we may be offended by the presence of
homeless people among us; they are a silent rebuke to our way of
life. "Once pitied, [the homeless are] now censured." ... But the
consequences of their status cannot be denied. "Reports abound
documenting the gradual but inexorable disintegration of body
and mind wrought by homelessness." . .. [John C. Connell]
described the condition of homeless persons:
The human costs of homeless living are unconscionable.
Food is often acquired only from charity or from public
trash.
Public restrooms offer rare opportunities for
practicing personal hygiene and cleanliness.
Days are
expended in aimless attempts to seek out minimal
sustenance through jobs, welfare, and various means of selfhelp. Moments of rest are stolen in the most public places.

Criminal and
sexual
victimization
is
common;
companionship is rare. The indignities are insufferable, at
least in the eyes of those not homeless."
The Justice concluded that although an expiration period for
benefits may be a bureaucratic necessity, the legislation should not be
understood to mean that
at the end of the year, EA recipients shall be returned to the
streets even though they have made every effort to turn their lives
around. To be told by the Agency chosen to provide shelter of
last resort that your time is up and you must return to the streets

is especially ironic.'
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Hern concluded that
the legislature did not intend to mandate homelessness by
terminating all benefits. The Court ordered continuation of benefits

17 Id. at 324, 633 A.2d at 975 (quotingJill Smolowe,
Giving the Cold Shoulder,TiME,
Dec. 6, 1993, at 28, 30; Connell, supra note 6, at 785-86).
IS Id. at 323, 633 A.2d at 974.
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for qualified claimants unless DHS shall designate another
governmental agency to provide shelter of last resort:
We cannot help but believe that our lawmakers do not intend to
bring about such results and do not intend that their general
appropriations for human services not attend to such needs.
If the time comes when our society can. no longer afford to
shelter the homeless, the Legislature will undoubtedly make that
clear.... In the absence of such a mandate, we believe that the
Legislature intends that the GA program be administered in such
a way as to provide temporary shelter for the most needy of our
citizens. A regulation that terminates TRA without a fall-back
provision for shelter conflicts with that purpose.19

In In re Petitionsfor Rulemaking NJ.A. C. 10:1.2 and 1085-4. 1,'0 the
Court was required to determine whether it was mandatory for DHS
to calculate the necessary benefit levels for recipients of the AFDC
21
and General Assistance Programs administered by that agency.
Justice O'Hern described the critical issue succinctly:
The issues in this case are narrow. The questions are not
whether there is a constitutional or a statutory entitlement to a
certain level of benefits, but only whether the agency must
establish, by a proper administrative process, what level of benefits
would be required to maintain the recipients in the measure of
dignity that the enabling legislation contemplates....
...[W] e recognize the unavoidable circularity in the process.
The agency contends that such a process is futile because in the
long run the standard of need will provide benefits only on paper;
the actual level of benefits will be those that the Legislature
establishes in the annual Appropriations Act.2
The Court's opinion, relying on a collaborative report
concerning child poverty, explained the context for the issue on
appeal:
The report concludes that in New Jersey today, children
represent 40% of the poor. Non-white children are four times
more likely to live in poverty than are white children. Although
children represent only 27% of the total population, they
represent close to half-277,000--of the people living in poverty
in New Jersey. Contrary to popular belief, most poor families do
not have large numbers of children. In New Jersey, the average
family size is 3-1/3 people. The average size of a poor family is 319
20
21
22

Id. at 324-25, 633 A.2d at 975.
117 N.J. 311, 566 A.2d 1154 (1989).
See id. at 314, 566 A.2d at 1155.
-.
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1/2 people. Minority families with children in New Jersey are
over four times more likely than white families with children to be
poor. Almost 30% of all black families and 21% of all Hispanic
families with children live in poverty.
A family of four receiving the maximum AFDC grant gets $443 a
month. Even with a full food stamp allotment of $183, this family
has less than 60% of the minimum cost of living in New Jersey.
While the cost of living in New Jersey increased by over 130%
between 1975 and 1985, AFDC payments increased by only 33%
during the same period.
We recognize that these data are not entirely current but they
represent 23the background against which the petitioners sought
this relief.
Justice O'Hern offered a simple but compelling rationale for
mandating that the agency determine the necessary level of benefits:
[I]t is a simple fact of human experience needing no empirical
demonstration that not until we see the face of poverty do we
react to it. The plight of the poor in places such as Appalachia
and Ethiopia would have escaped attention were their suffering
children not seen.
In short, there is every reason to believe that an informed
society will react more humanely than an uninformed. Dickens'
fables may represent the reality of human experience. We are not
given visions of the future to guide our decisionmaking. We
ought at least have a clear vision of the present.
In a society of government under law, it remains the province of
courts, under their traditional review powers, to determine what
are the express or implied legislative policies in an enactment.
Naturally, the choice of programs or measures that will
implement the policies is for the agencies. We have consistently
held that the agencies have the broadest power in determining
how to allocate available resources....
But this is a case involving not the level of benefits or the
determination of what benefits will be awarded, but rather what
benefits are needed.24

Writing for an unanimous Court, Justice O'Hern concluded that
DHS must calculate the necessary level of benefits:

316-17, 566 A.2d at 1156.
Id. at 322, 325-26, 566 A.2d at 1160, 1161 (citing Barone v. NewJersey Dep't of

23 Id. at
24

Human Servs., 107 N.J. 355, 370, 526 A.2d 1055, 1063 (1987)).
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We have no "illusion that a court byjudicial fiat can enforce the
idealism of poets." Like that Court, we do not sit here as a super
legislature, nor do we concern ourselves with the wisdom of the
administrative choices. Rather, we view this matter as within our
proper role of deciding questions of legislative intent.
We agree with DHS that the Legislature does not need DHS'
advice about issues so obvious as the ever-increasing cost of
subsistence in our society. At the same time, the past agency
acquiescence in the overarching authority of the Legislature to
establish the level of public-assistance grants does not obviate the
conclusion that the enabling legislation reasonably calls for
further agency definition of the broad-based statutory standards
of the two programs. We do not believe that the Legislature
intends that this regulatory process be suspended because it
cannot always be implemented.... It is hard to conceive how this
obligation can be met until the needs are known.2
Among Justice O'Hern's many majority opinions in the field of
criminal law, two that stand out are State v. Roth 6 and State v. Hodge,7
cases in which the Court set standards for appellate review of criminal
sentencing decisions under the newly enacted Code of Criminal
Justice (Code). 8 In Roth, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated
sexual assault, a first-degree crime. Because of defendant's severe
alcohol dependence, as well as numerous letters of support urging
that defendant's conduct was aberrational and resulted from his
alcohol and drug addiction, the sentencing court imposed a five-year
probationary term conditioned on defendant enrolling in an inpatient rehabilitation program. Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice O'Hern meticulously reviewed the evolution of changes in
sentencing philosophy throughout the country and in New Jersey.2"
The Justice also reviewed the structure of the Code and, in detail,
summarized the Code's sentencing provisions. 0
In language
frequently quoted by reviewing courts, Justice O'Hern also set forth
the standards governing appellate review of criminal sentencing:

25 Id. at 326-28, 566 A.2d at 1161-62 (quoting Avant v. Clifford, 67 NJ. 496, 517,
341 A.2d 629, 640 (1975)).
26 95 NJ. 334, 471 A.2d 370 (1984).
27 95 N.J. 369, 471 A.2d 389 (1984).
28 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2c:1-1 to 98-4 (West 1983).
29 See Roth, 95 N.J. at 345-55, 471 A.2d at
375-81.
30 See id. at 354-55, 356-61, 471
A.2d at 375-81, 382-385.
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First, we will always require that an exercise of discretion be
based upon findings of fact that are grounded in competent,
reasonably credible evidence....
Second, we will always require that the factfinder apply correct
legal principles in exercising its discretion....
Third, we will exercise that reserve of judicial power to modify
sentences when the application of the facts to the law is such a
clear error of judgment that it shocks the judicial conscience....
We anticipate that we will not be required to invoke this judicial
power frequently.
We must avoid the substitution of appellate judgment for trial
courtjudgment. What we seek by our review is not a difference in
judgment, but only a judgment that reasonable people may not
reasonably make on the basis of the evidence presented[.]
Pronouncement of judgment of sentence is among the most
solemn and serious responsibilities of a trial court. No word
formula will ever eliminate this requirement that justice be done.
There is no room for trial or appellate courts to consider the
public perceptions of sentences: "Judicial recognition of or
action upon public opinion against a particular defendant cannot
be tolerated in our criminal justice system." . . . We are confident

that our judges are people of "fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy
climate." . . . Our new Code reflects a delicate balance between
discretion and fixed sentencing. An independent judiciary is its
fulcrum. When conscientious trial judges exercise discretion in
accordance with the principles set forth in the Code and defined
by us today, they need fear no second-guessing.3
Finally, Justice O'Hern concluded that the failure to sentence the
defendant within the authorized sentencing range for first-degree
offenses constituted an unauthorized departure from the Code's
sentencing guidelines, requiring a remand for re-sentencing.
In Hodge, the defendant admitted committing acts of sexual
intercourse with his thirteen-year-old stepdaughter and pled guilty to
aggravated sexual assault. The trial judge sentenced defendant to
sixty-three days in prison, five years probation, and mandatory
psychiatric treatment because defendant was a first offender and
regularly employed, and because of the severe effect that
imprisonment would have on his family. Justice O'Hern carefully
s, Id. at 363-65, 471 A.2d at 386-87 (quoting State v. Humphreys, 89 N.J. 4, 15,
444 A.2d 569 (1982); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947)).
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reviewed the presumptive sentencing structure of the Code and
concluded that the trial court's failure to focus on the severity of the
crime, rather than on factors personal to the defendant, required
that the sentence imposed be set aside:
We conclude that the trial court relied on pre-Code sentencing
guidelines. This approach balanced the defendant's capacity for
rehabilitation with the other purposes of punishment, rather than
following the offense-oriented analysis of the Code. The trial
court tended to view the crime itself as only one factor among
many to consider at sentencing, whereas the severity of the crime
is now the single most important factor in the sentencing process.
...
We realize there is no calculus that will guide the pen to the
perfect sentence. Indeed, these few years following adoption of
the Code have been a period of adjustment and transition,
resulting at times in a confusion of philosophies. In various
places, the Code itself gives conflicting signals about the
philosophical justification for punishment ....
Front line judges
need not be faulted for their judgments in these circumstances.

Because of the view that we take of the offense-oriented
sentencing standards of the Code as it stood even before passage
of the 1981 amendments, we believe that the sentence imposed
must be set aside. 2
The opinions in Roth and Hodge remain to this day as the sources
of the definitive standards for reviewing criminal sentences imposed
under the Code. In the same vein, Justice O'Hern's landmark
opinion in State v. Yarbough, 3 although partially overridden by
legislation, 4 remains the guiding standard for trial courts in deciding
whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. Similarly,
Justice O'Hern's opinion in State v. Dunbar5 sets forth the standards
that continue to guide sentencing judges in the imposition of
extended terms.
Justice O'Hern authored more than 230 majority opinions
during his nineteen-year tenure on the Court. Neither time nor
space permit a detailed analysis of those opinions except to observe
their common thread. They are pragmatic, scholarly, humane, and
fair. The following are among my personal favorites: Butler v. Acme
Markets,36 which upheld the duty of a store owner to provide warnings

32

33
4
55
36

See Hodge, 95 N.J. at 378-79, 394-95.
100 N.J. 627, 498 A.2d 1239 (1985).
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2c:44-5 (West 1984).
108 N.J. 80, 527 A.2d 1346 (1987).
89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982).
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or adequate protection for patrons when risk of harm from criminal
assault is prevalent; 7 Boss v. Rockland Electric Co.,8 which held that
where resolution of a dispute involves the determination of issues
within the special competence of an administrative agency, the court
should refer those issues to the agency for resolution; 9 Wunschel v.
Jersey City,4° which held that procedures in the Division of Workers'

Compensation and in the Law Division should be molded to avoid
conflicting decisions on the issue of a worker's employment status at
the time of his death;4 ' Loigman v. Kimmelman,42 which adopted a
balancing test to determine a citizen's right of access to sensitive
44
public documents; 4 1 Carteret Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Davis, which

observed that "we have some difficulty in picking out the 'little guy' in
the group that attends ... a foreclosure sale;, 45 Ostrowski v. Azara,46
which applied the doctrine of avoidable consequences in holding
that a jury may be instructed to consider the post-treatment conduct
of a diabetic, cigarette-smoking patient when apportioning damages
on the patient's medical malpractice claim;4'7 Lebel v. Everglades
Marina,Inc.,48 which concluded that the Florida seller of a luxury boat
to a New Jersey resident had sufficient minimum contacts to be
subjected to suit in New Jersey courts;4 9 In re Determination of Executive
Committee on Ethical Standards, ° which held that a Rutgers Law
professor conducting a clinical teaching program seeking to
represent a client before a state agency could not be regarded as a
"State employee" for the purposes of New Jersey Conflicts of Interest
Law; 5' Phillips v. Curiale,52 which held that a 1987 statute that restored
immunity to fellow National Guard members and made applicable to
"all actions and proceedings that accrue, are pending or are filed
after June 1, 1986" did not apply retroactively to bar the plaintiffs
37

39

40
41
42
43
44
45
47
49
50

51
52

See id. at 273, 445 A.2d at 1142.
95 N.J. 33, 468 A.2d 1055 (1983).
See id. at 36, 468 A.2d at 1056-57.
96 N.J. 651, 477A.2d 329 (1984).
See id. at 656, 477 A.2d at 331.
102 N.J. 98, 505 A.2d 958 (1986).
See id. at 101, 505 A.2d at 960.
105 N.J. 344, 521 A.2d 831 (1987).
Id. at 350, 521 A.2d at 834.
111 N.J. 429, 545 A.2d 148 (1988).
See id. at 431-31, 545 A.2d at 149.
115 N.J. 317, 558 A.2d 1252 (1989).
See id. at 329-30, 558 A.2d at 1258.
116 N.J. 216, 561 A.2d 542 (1989).
See id. at 218, 561 A.2d at 543.
128 N.J. 608, 608 A.2d 895 (1992).
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suit filed in 1980;*5 North Jersey Newspapers Co. v. Passaic County,' which
concluded that the Right-To-Know law does not provide an
unqualified right of access to telephone toll records of a public body
that would disclose the identity of the persons called; 55 Instructional
Systems, Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp.,- which held that evidence
concerning the relationship between a producer of a computerized
educational learning system and the producer's exclusive regional
distributor was sufficient to establish a community of interest, thereby
constituting a franchise entitled to protection under New Jersey
Franchise Practices Act;5 7 D'Agostino v. Johnson &Johnson, Inc., which

concluded that New Jersey rather than Swiss law governed the claim
in New Jersey court of the plaintiff, a United States citizen, Swiss
resident, and employee of the Swiss subsidiary of a New Jersey
corporation seeking damages for wrongful discharge allegedly based
on the plaintiffs refusal to participate in the illegal bribing of Swiss
licensing authorities; 59 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co.,l
which adopted the "continuous-trigger" theory of liability, holding
that when a progressive indivisible injury or damage results from
exposure to injurious conditions, courts may treat such injury or
damage as an occurrence within each year of the Comprehensive
General Liability policy;1 Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories,62 which held that
drug manufacturers that directly market prescription drugs to
consumers are not insulated from liability for injuries caused by a
failure to warn the patient of harmful side effects.o
No review of Justice O'Hern's judicial work-product could be
complete without reference to his separate opinions, which reflect
some of his most deeply felt views. For example, in State v. Hempele,64
the Court held that pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 7 of the New
Jersey Constitution, a police search of a citizen's garbage bags without
probable cause was unconstitutional.6 5 Justice O'Hern, concurring in
53

55

57
59

See id. at 612, 608 A.2d at 897.
127 N.J. 9, 601 A.2d 693 (1992).
See id. at 11, 601 A.2d at 694 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 47: 1A-1 to -4 (West 1992)).
130 N.J. 324, 614 A.2d 124 (1992).

See id. at 328, 614 A.2d at 126.

133 N.J. 516, 628 A.2d 305 (1993).

See id. at 519, 628 A.2d at 307.

60 138 N.J. 437, 650A.2d 974 (1994).
61 See id. at 478-80, 650 A.2d at 995-96.
62 161 N.J. 1, 734 A.2d 1245 (1999).
See id. at 5, 734 A.2d at 1247.
120 N.J. 182, 576 A.2d 793 (1990).
65

See id. at 188, 576 A.2d at 796.
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part and dissenting in part, eloquently expressed his strong belief
that our Court generally should adhere to United States Supreme
constitutional
counterpart
interpreting
in
decisions
Court

guarantees. TheJustice wrote:
This case is not about garbage. This case is about the values of
federalism. Were I a member of the United States Supreme
Court, I might well have voted differently from the majority in
California v. Greenwood.... Justice Clifford's painstaking analysis of
the issues is quite persuasive and it convincingly demonstrates
that the United States Supreme Court may have drawn the line a
bit too far in that case.
But that is not the real issue in this case. The issue is the basis
on which we shall depart from Supreme Court precedent in
interpreting counterpart guarantees of our Constitution. On that
score, I quite agree with Justice Garibaldi that this case falls
convincingly short of standards that the Court has been
developing....
For me, it is not enough to say that because we disagree with a
majority opinion of the Supreme Court, we should invoke our
It sounds
State Constitution to achieve a contrary result.
plausible, but one of the unanticipated consequences of that
supposedly benign doctrine of state-constitutional rights is an
inevitable shadowing of the moral authority of the United States
Supreme Court. Throughout our history, we have maintained a
resolute trust in that Court as the guardian of our liberties.
Respect for law flows from a belief in its objectivity. To the
extent possible, we ought not personalize constitutional doctrine.
When we do otherwise, we vindicate the worst fears of the critics
The fourth amendment is the fourth
of judicial activism.
amendment. It ought not mean one thing in Trenton and
another across the Delaware River in Morrisville, Pennsylvania.
In truth, the constitutional vision that we have shared as a
people is not one of state-constitutional guarantees of freedom.
Whether God-given or the result of social compact, the content of
our freedom under law is drawn from the Bill of Rights. I rather
doubt that most Americans think otherwise. One need only recall
that it was the Supreme Court, not state courts, that guaranteed
freedom of religion.... For good or ill, this unique American
vision of freedom has been nurtured by the United States
Supreme Court. There may come a time when the Supreme
Court might abdicate its responsibility and we would have to act,
but this is surely not it. Where that Court has drawn the line in
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this case does not significantly endanger our freedoms. I would
abide by its judgment. If there is a New Jersey view on this issue,
the Legislature can vindicate it in time.
Like most Americans, I don't like people snooping around in
my garbage and I doubt that most police officers will want to do
that. But we certainly need more reason than this to discard the
vision of one nation under law.
The Appellate Division made a measured disposition of the
issues that fairly took into account the state and federal interests.
It would have recognized a limited privacy interest in discarded
materials and balanced that with a requirement for reasonably
based police action. That disposition would serve our state needs.
I would affirm both of its dispositions.6
Justice O'Hern also has written separately in numerous death
penalty appeals to reflect his view that that ultimate penalty not be
imposed unless a defendant's right to a fair trial has been
scrupulously honored. In State v. Marshall,67 the Justice expressed the
view that prosecutorial misconduct mandated reversal of defendant's
death penalty:
[N]othing can excuse, justify, or undo the State's attempt to
disparage Marshall's exercise of his right to call witnesses on his
behalf, guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the Constitution.
In summation, the prosecutor stated:
And he has the audacity to bring in his three boys to testify.
That's obscene. And I'm not being critical of them because
I would probably do the same thing. To put his boys on that
witness stand is obscene, and for that there's a place in hell
for him. He will use anybody, he will say anything and he
will do anything, including his own family, to get out from
under, and that's Robert Oakley Marshall. Make no mistake
about it.
When did it become "obscene" for a man presumed to be
innocent under our system of law to call witnesses on his own
behalf?
The dry curative instructions given by the trial court hardly
sufficed to dispel the visual image of a place in hell for defendant
that the prosecutor planted in the jurors' minds. Those remarks
were neither accidental nor the result of the passion of a heated
Id. at 225-28, 576 A.2d at 815-16 (O'Hern,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citations omitted).
123 N.J. 1, 586A.2d 85 (1991).
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trial. They were planned. Contemporary statements by the
prosecution to the press set forth in the record demonstrate that.
But deciding whether a man shall live or die is not the product
of building blocks of evidence. "Jurors [in capital sentencing] are
not mere fact finders, but the ultimate determiners of whether
the defendant shall live or die." Even under today's structure the
jury's function surely remains what Chief Justice Weintraub
described as "a moral judgment upon a consideration of the
evidence."
Whether there will be "a place in hell" for this defendant
remains for a greaterjudge than any of us. What we must decide
is whether the sentence of death was imposed in accordance with
law. A sentence of death is not imposed in accordance with law
when a jury has been influenced by repeated instances of
constitutional error and governmental misconduct. 68
This Court's "right-to-die" cases presented Justice O'Hern with
difficult moral and jurisprudential choices.
In In re Peter by
Johanning,6 the Justice expressed with profound feeling his views of
the difficult value judgments posed by such cases:
In this case, unlike that of Kathleen Farrell, there is no moral,
medical, or ethical consensus that a surrogate decisionmaker may
elect to discontinue the nurture of an incompetent patient
deemed incapable of regaining any semblance of her former life.
None of us would want to experience the anguish of choice that
families in this situation must suffer. The question is, what is our
role as a court in shaping or reflecting that societal consensus?
Why exactly are we asked to intervene at all? As the majority has
correctly noted, death and dying are not strangers to our history.
We are asked to intervene now because science has forced
medical choices upon us that we have yet fully to resolve in the
context of our values....
What then should be the role of law in resolving these choices?
All agree that within appropriate confines self-determination is a
value held paramount in our culture and law. We each should
have the right to face inevitable and imminent death in the
manner that is most consistent with our beliefs in our dignity as
humans and perhaps more. But it is another thing to determine
for others how and when they shall meet death. There are many
Id. at 212-14, 586 A.2d at 198-99 (O'Hern,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citations omitted).
108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
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lives that some consider not worth living. Whom shall we entrust
to make that judgment for another, and by what standards?
Our understanding of human consciousness is limited by the
extent of our own knowledge. We are informed that the only
thing known with certainty about severely brain-damaged patients
is that the patient cannot communicate with the outer world. It is
not known what communications the patient can receive. I am
not prepared to accept the description cited to us of one expert
that the patient "is a plant." Has anyone ever seen a nursing
professional who did not treat a comatose patient with the
deepest respect? Why do we speak to, comfort, and hold such
patients? Because we realize that they are no less human than we,
even though they are unable in any way to express that humanity.
They are not the people that we knew, but they remain the people
that we love. In the cases before us, it is undoubtedly that love
that deeply moves the parties.
We cannot, however, as I have said, fail to recognize when we set
standards. When a court "allows such [life-ending] decisions,"
and "circumscribes the practice (to safeguard well-being)," and
"shapes social institutions," . . . it makes a profound statement.

The Court wishes that it were not so. It believes: "[I]n this as in
every case, the ultimate decision is not for the Court. The
decision is primarily that of the patient, competent or
incompetent, and the patient's family or guardian and physician."
...I respect the fact that the Court wishes not to intrude in this
area of intense personal privacy and suffering. It is not possible,
however, to adopt neutral principles. Implicit in every such
decision of this Court is a statement that transcends not only the
case before the Court, but the boundaries of this jurisdiction. It is
only two terms since we decided Claire Conroy's case. It is
sometimes forgotten that on a record in that case similar to the
one at bar, we concurred in the reversal of the judgment that
would have discontinued feeding her. Therefore, I respectfully
dissent. 70

Similarly, in In re Jobes, the Justice thoughtfully expressed his
disagreement with a disposition that required health care providers
to participate unwillingly in the life-terminating process:

70

Id. at 386-89, 393-94, 529 A.2d at 430-31, 433 (O'Hern,J., dissenting) (citations

omitted).
71 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
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While I dissent from the disposition in this case primarily for
the reasons stated in the companion case of In re Peter, . . . I

reiterate my respect for the aggrieved family and their
conscientious decision. I ask them only to consider that the
restraints of the law that seem so cruel to them may reflect an
equally profound respect for patients not surrounded by a family
as loving as theirs. It is not possible for us to construct a
substantive principle of law based upon the intact family status.
We must construct a substantive principle of law that will endure
in all circumstances.
I add only, with respect to the discussion of this case, a concern
about a court compelling a health care provider to furnish
treatment that is contrary to its own medical standards. I find it
difficult to understand how we can order nursing professionals
with an abiding respect for their patients to cease to furnish the
most basic of human needs to a patient in their care. I do not
believe that such an order is essential to the Court's decision, and
it may impinge upon the privacy rights of those nursing
professionals. This is not a case in which the physical facilities of
a licensed health care provider are being denied to professionals
who disagree with the provider's policy, it is a case in which the
health care providers firmly believe the treatment is adverse to the
patient. I believe a proper balance could be obtained by adhering
to the procedure adopted in In re Quinlan [70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647 (1976)], that would have allowed the nonconsenting
physician not to participate in the life-terminating process. This
was essentially the approach taken by the conscientious treating
physician in Kathleen Farrell's case.
On rare occasions during his judicial tenureJustice O'Hern was
moved to write not only separately, but bluntly, to underscore his
disagreement with the Court. One such instance was in Self v. Board
of Review, 3 where the Court held that the claimants had quit their
jobs and thus were banned from receiving unemployment benefits.
Justice O'Hern observed:
There is a difference between quitting and being fired from a
job. Only in the regulatory world do the concepts get confused.
The fact is that these two claimants didn't quit their jobs. They
were fired after they couldn't get to work for two days because
they had lost their ride. No reading of this record will disclose
evidence to support a contrary finding....

Id. at 453-54, 529 A.2d at 464-65 (O'Hern,J., dissenting) (citing In re Peter, 108
N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976)).
73 91 N.J. 453, 453 A.2d 170 (1982).
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The supervisor knew he had fired the claimants. In fact, they
testified that he was the one who told them to apply for
unemployment insurance. These claimants were hardworking
building maintenance employees. They wanted work, not a
handout.
Had they been given a few days to arrange
transportation, they might have been able to return to work.
Under these circumstances, only a legal fiction of Kafkaesque
71
subtlety can convert their discharge into a voluntary quit.

More recently, in Baird v. American Medical Optcs,75 Justice
O'Hern strongly expressed his disagreement with the Court's holding

that plaintiffs lack-of-informed-consent claim accrued at the same
time as her malpractice claim. The Justice observed:
Only one such as Anatole France could adequately capture the
irony in the Court's judgment. A sight-impaired woman has lost
her claim that she was the unwitting subject of experimental eye
surgery in part because she should have more carefully read the
release form that she signed before undergoing the surgery. In
order to reach that result the Court has improperly fused the
accrual of two separate claims and thereby avoids resolution of a
factual dispute whether plaintiff was informed of the
experimental nature of the eye surgery.
It is shattering to think that a person who was essentially a
guinea pig should be deprived of her cause of action based on
absence of informed consent because she knew something was
wrong with her eyes after the surgery. The majority reasons that
"diligence requires an injured party, once he or she knows of one
claim against the defendant, to investigate all other related
claims." The proposition may be valid in other contexts, but its
relevance to this case rests shakily on the unstated premise that
plaintiff's malpractice and informed consent claims are
inextricably related. I cannot accept that premise because the two
claims share neither a legal nor a factual relationship ....

It is one

thing to draw an inept surgeon. It is another thing to be treated
as a human guinea pig.
Because plaintiffs informed consent claim is distinct from her
treatment claim, plaintiff is entitled to a factual hearing on
whether her doctor was reasonably diligent in determining
whether plaintiff understood that she was to be a laboratory
74
75

Id. at 460-61, 453 A.2d at 174 (O'Hern,J., dissenting).
155 N.J. 54, 713 A.2d 1019 (1998).
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animal in the service of medical science-whether she
understood that the development of the [intraocular lens] was
still in the "anything can happen" stage. Her signature on the
consent form would serve as evidence at that hearing. It might in
fact prevent her from prevailing. But at the summary judgment
stage, her signature should not serve to deny her the opportunity
to prove her case, as the majority suggests it would.
Her
entitlement to a hearing seems elementary to me and is not too
much to ask for a woman who has lost her eyesight in a case of
experimental surgery.'(
Only last term in Konzelman v. Konzelman," Justice O'Hern
expressed his strongly held belief that property settlement
agreements terminating alimony in the event of the wife's cohabitation with an unrelated male are contrary to public policy. The
Justice wrote:
The private lives of divorced women are no business of the law.
We have enough to do without inquiring into such matters.
However, the economic needs of divorced women are the
business of the law....
Today, the Court turns back the clock on years of efforts to
improve the economic and social status of divorced women. In a
long series of cases, we had come to recognize that marriage is
both an affair of the heart and a form of an economic
partnership. .

.

. Often the woman has taken the subordinate

economic role in the marital partnership, assuming child-rearing
or other non-income-generating roles.
Thus, as society is
presently structured, the divorced woman will often have the
greater economic need. That should not mean that a woman's
personal life after divorce should be a matter of judicial
supervision.
When viewed through the Gaussian filter employed by the
Court, the anti-cohabitation clause appears as a pleasant piece of
bargaining between equals. Although the Court properly declines
to presume that all women are passive players in this arena, it fails
to afford proper weight to the uneven economic playing field
upon which the contest takes place.
The Court repeats the reasoning of the Appellate Division that
"there are no considerations of public policy which should
76 Id.

at 77, 79, 82, 713 A.2d at 1030-31, 1033 (O'HernJ., dissenting) (citations
and footnote omitted).
77 158 N.J. 185, 729 A.2d 7
(1999).
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prevent competent parties to a divorce from freely agreeing [to
an anti-cohabitation clause]. ..." In other words, a deal is a deal.

Not so long ago in the Baby M. decision, Chief Justice Wilentz
dispatched such reasoning in a single sentence. He wrote:
"There are, in a civilized society, some things that money cannot
buy." In a civilized society, money cannot buy a woman's right to
choose her companions. A husband should not be able to
demand an exchange of that freedom as a bargaining tool. 78
Two
recurring
themes
underlying
Justice
O'Hern's
jurisprudential views were his profound belief in the sanctity of jury
verdicts and his deep respect for lawyers and the values of the legal
professions. Those themes coalesced when the Justice dissented from
the Court's disciplinary disposition in In re Rigolosi.7 Justice O'Hern
observed:
But here we do more than depart from precedent. We disbar
an attorney exonerated by a jury of any criminal involvement in
the corrupt scheme detailed in In re Conway. I recognize that a
criminal acquittal does not of itself preclude the imposition of an
ethical sanction when the totality of the circumstances plainly
manifests an unethical, although not criminal, violation. But
when the central issue of ethical failure is so closely intertwined
with the jury's finding of innocence on a single, crucial factual
issue, respect for the meaning of trial by jury compels me not to
impeach the jury's verdict.
Hence, discipline is in order-but what discipline?
Even
respondent's most troubling statement to Lazaro on the way
home after the August 19th dinner-"was that handled clean
enough, that ah, you know?"-evokes the ethical ambiguity that
our cases have sought to dispel. Does that ambiguity demonstrate
the total failure of character that is the premise for disbarment in
the absence of conviction of serious crime? It is not possible to
read the transcript of these proceedings or of the trial without
some sense of doubt in reaching the conclusion that respondent
must be disbarred.
There is no unerring evidence that
demonstrates that defendant has an utterly "unsalvageable
professional character," or is "beyond the pale of professional
rehabilitation." ...

78 Id. at 204-06, 729 A.2d 17-18 (quoting In reBaby M., 109 N.J. 396, 440,
537 A.2d
1227, 1332 (1988) (citations omitted).
7. 107 N.J. 192, 526 A.2d 670 (1987).
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As I explained in Conway, I have arrived at this judgment by a
different route from that of the other members of the Court. But
even if I approached this question as does the majority, I would
assign a pre-eminent value to the meaning of trial by jury. In
cases like this, when the State has candidly acknowledged its use
of State officials to engage others in the commission of crime
(and I imply no criticism of that regrettably necessary means of
law enforcement), it may be better to err on the side of the jury
on the crucial 2uestion of whether respondent joined in the
corrupt scheme.
Although Justice O'Hern did not often write separately in
disciplinary matters, his profound respect for lawyers and his steadfast
insistence that no discipline be imposed without clear and convincing
evidence of misconduct often shaped the Court's conference
deliberations in disciplinary matters.
To Justice O'Hern, every
lawyer's license and livelihood were of great consequence, and he
never overlooked the human element in disciplinary cases. Those
unique characteristics were never more evident than in his eloquent
and moving separate opinion in In re Valentin.1 He wrote:
We have ordinarily disbarred attorneys who have sold drugs.
This case requires special concern.
On July 6, 1969, Frank Valentin was drafted into the United
States Army. His service took him to a combat unit in the central
highlands of Vietnam. He received the Purple Heart and other
commendations for his service. Unfortunately, like so many other
veterans of that war, he became addicted to drugs and suffered a
profound mental disorder from the loss of close comrades.
He resolved to live a life in emulation of one of his fallen
comrades. He returned to his community in the Bronx. He
worked full-time at night as a uniformed court officer while
putting himself through Seton Hall Law School and raising a
family. In 1986, he was admitted to the New York bar and opened
up a law practice in the Bronx.
Unfortunately, he could never shed his addiction to heroin. He
led a double life. At once an admired member of his community
rendering counsel to others and at the same time living a life of
drug dependency. He has pled guilty in New York to a thirddegree criminal sale of drugs charge involving the sale of a pound
of cocaine for $11,500.
There are overtones of greater
involvement. These are disputed. Were we to premise discipline
80

Id. at 211-13, 216, 526 A.2d at 682-83, 684 (citing In re Conway, 107 N.J. 168,

526 A.2d 658 (1987)) (citations omitted).
81 147 NJ. 499, 688 A.2d 602 (1997).
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on disputed facts, we would have to conduct a hearing to establish
the predicate for discipline....
On the occasion
described him thus:

of respondent's

sentencing, the

court

He was a court officer for a number of years, highly
respected, received commendations, went to law school,
became an attorney, and became a successful practitioner,
and has appeared before me on many occasions and has
done well for his clients. Apparently has a drug problem
which goes back many years. He has a psychiatric history
which also goes back many years [for] which he has received
treatments as a result of the Vietnam War, at different
veterans' hospitals. He has a family, a wife, children. He's
worked hard all his life and done the good things that were
supposed to be done by the people who represent
defendants, and people in public office and public life. I
can't go into the motives in this matter because I really don't
know what the motives were.
Valentin's motives to make the drug sale were clouded by a
dispute with an undercover agent over the sale of a car. We have
the case on a motion for reciprocal discipline pursuant to Rule
1:20-14(a) (4). Under that Rule we would ordinarily impose the
identical action or discipline taken by the other jurisdiction
unless "the misconduct established warrants substantially different
discipline." Under New York practice, a disbarred attorney may
seek reinstatement seven years after the effective date of
disbarment. NewJersey disbarment is final.
We have therefore ordinarily not disbarred attorneys unless the
attorney's conduct is so "immoral, venal, corrupt or criminal as to
destroy totally any vestige of confidence that the individual could
ever again practice in conformity with the standards of the
profession."

We thus reasoned in In re Farr . . . that when the

cause of ethical transgressions seem to be "some mental,
emotional, or psychological state or medical condition that is not
obvious and . . . could be corrected through treatment," the

respondent "need not be disbarred to preserve confidence in the
bar or to protect the public." In this case, the circumstances do
not unerringly point to a conclusion that Frank Valentin has an
utterly "unsalvageable professional character," or is utterly
"beyond the pale of professional rehabilitation," the traits that call
for disbarment.
Most of us can only learn second-hand how Valentin's service
experience in Vietnam could have affected his life. Were we to
offer him the hope of redemption through restoration to practice
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upon a showing of a drug-free life for seven years, we might not
just salvage a lawyer,
we might. salvage
a life. Is it wrong to suggest
. ..
82
that we mightjust owe him this?
For ajustice retiring from our Court it is perhaps better to avoid
looking back. So much effort, contemplation, and soul-searching are
invested in the Court's work that it is impossible to recapture the
experience by retracing one's steps. For a colleague and friend to do
so, however, is an easier and less painful process. Nevertheless,
retracing some of Justice O'Hern's steps is, for me, a poignant task
because it underscores his humanity, his intellectual strength, and
the aggregate impact of his influence on the Court. We shall not
soon see his like again.

82 Id. 147 N.J. at 504-06, 688 A.2d at 605-06 (quoting In re Farr, 115 N.J. 231, 237,
557 A.2d 1373, 1377 (1989)) (citations omitted).

